Q: Why didn't USA ask India to fight in the Afghanistan (War on Terror) given that it is much closer to India?
In 2001, Indo-US relationship was still nascent [by the end of Bush regime it would be really strong] and traditionally India has been against putting troops without the UN banner. Sending troops to fight alongside NATO would have been a huge political scandal at home. And the US needed Pakistan [Taliban’s creator] and didn’t want to spook them. Thus, it made sense for both countries to keep their cooperation silent.
When the Americans wanted to put the ground forces to remove Taliban do you know whom they relied on? It is the Indo-Iranian-Russian funded group called Northern Alliance whose members were originally fighting the American-Pakistani-Saudi funded Mujahideen groups in 80s & 90s. When they handed over the leadership to locals they brought the Indian educated Hamid Karzai.
India has been playing a role in Afghanistan for a long time, but like everything else in Indian foreign policy, it is fairly subtle. A deadly triangle: Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. India would not openly ally with any major power, but prefers to do things in the background. Afghanistan is the second largest recipient of Indian aid, after Bhutan.
India has also been training Afghan security forces and police, apart from supplying infrastructure. With US leaving, is Afghanistan turning to India? - One big handicap for India is that there is no direct access to Afghanistan. Afghanistan turns to India for military helicopters, likely to rile Pakistan Pakistan sits in the way and doesn’t let India reach Afghanistan easily through air or land. This is why India has been working with Iran to build an alternative logistics route that completely skips Pakistan. India, Iran and Afghanistan sign Chabahar port agreement
Q: Is it true that Nehru rejected a permanent seat offered to India in the UN Security Council by The US?
There was never a firm offer. That was a mere tease that would have never happened - once proposed by the Soviet Union and once by the United States. The issue is far more complicated than the simplistic statements that is claimed on this. that Here is a recent paper on this based on a Phd dissertation that was done on this topic: https://www.wilsoncenter.[removed]org/sit...
Sashi Tharoor - an expert on both Congress party and United Nations also wrote a detailed account on this: `Nehru declined offer of permanent U.N. seat'
While I’m not a big fan of Nehru, I don’t think he was stupid either. He took fairly shrewd moves here. And I don’t know of any respectable analyst who have both researched this issue and faulted Nehru for this.
Let me attempt to summarize that paper:
- There were two vague offers - one by the US in 1950 and one by the Soviet Union in 1955. The US “offer” came around the time when Mao took China as a communist republic. The Soviet Union “offer” came around the time of Nehru’s landmark visit to USSR that built the Indo-USSR friendship.
- Both the cases were about India getting the UNSC seat in place of China whose seat was given to a renegade ROC government. In both cases, the superpowers feared China for their own reasons.
- Both the vague offers were fairly kneejerk affairs. The first by fear and second from euphoria. They were never followed through.
- Nehru still wanted the UNSC seat, just not at the cost of China’s seat.
Since the US and USSR didn’t simultaneously offer anything, India had no chance of getting through. Had India shook US hands in 1950, the Soviets would have vetoed and had India shook USSR hands in 1955, US would have vetoed. The bigger powers were interested in their own games and would not have let India into the club without being sure that it will side them in conflict. There was no way India could have sided both US and USSR.
While there was near zero chance for getting through even if Nehru had said yes to the initial proposal, there were plenty of risks:
- Offend China and bring the eventual 1962 war a lot sooner.
- Destroy India’s reputation as a nation with a principled foreign policy.
- Lose independence in foreign policy and become a pawn of one of the superpowers.
Thus, there was no upside [no chance of getting the UNSC], but plenty of downsides by merely accepting the initial proposal. In short, Nehru received vague proposals, but immediately realized that these were not real offers but traps to get India into a bigger game.
(The author, Mr.Balaji Vishwanathan (formerly from the USA), is a VP of a Company and an avid political observer of India and its foreign policies.)
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