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Question 1
Direction: Read the passage carefully and answer the questions that follow.
If American policy towards Europe in the postwar years had been a conspicuous success, and towards Asia a disappointing balance between success and failure, it could be said that the most conspicuous thing about relations with Latin America was the absence of any policy. Franklin Roosevelt, to be sure, had launched a “Good Neighbour” policy, but being a good neighbour was, it seemed, a negative rather than a positive affair, a matter of keeping hands off, of making the Monroe Doctrine, in form at least, multilateral. All through the postwar years, the states of Latin America, Mexico and Chile were partial exceptions, they were in the throes of major economic and social crisis. Population was growing faster than in any other part of the globe, without a comparable increase in wealth or productivity; the gap between the poor and the rich was widening; and as the rich and powerful turned to the military for the preservation of order and privilege, the poor turned to revolution.
Deeply involved in other quarters of the globe, the United States paid little attention to the fortunes or misfortunes of her neighbours to the south, and when she did intervene, it appeared to be on the side of order and the status quo rather than on the side of reform. So frightened was the United States of “Communism” in Latin America that it preferred a military dictatorship to reformers who might drift too far to the “left”, and sustained a Batista in Cuba, a Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, a Peron in Argentina, and a Jimenez in Venezuela.
In his last two years, President Eisenhower had tried to mend his Latin American fences. Though rejecting a Brazilian proposal of a Marshall Plan for Latin America, he did take the initiative in setting up an Inter- American Development Bank with a capital of one billion dollars, almost half of it supplied by the United States. Other government investments in Latin America ran to some four million dollars, while private investments exceeded nine billion. Yet though to most Americans, all this seemed a form of economic aid, many Latin Americans regarded it as economic imperialism. In September 1960, came a co-operative plan that could not be regarded as other than enlightened: the Act of Bogota, which authorized a grant of half a billion dollars to subsidize not only economic but social and educational progress in Latin America. “We are not saints”, said President Eisenhower when he visited Santiago de Chile, “We know we make mistakes, but our heart is in the right place”.
But was it? President Kennedy was confronted by the same dilemma that had perplexed his predecessors. Clearly, it was essential to provide a large-scale aid to the countries south of Rio Grande, but should this aid go to bolster up established regimes and thus help maintain status quo, or should it be used to speed up social reforms, even at the risk of revolt? As early as 1958, the then Senator Kennedy had asserted that “the objective of our aid program in Latin America should not be to purchase allies, but to consolidate a free and democratic Western Hemisphere, alleviating those conditions which might foster opportunities for communistic infiltration and unite our people on the basis of constantly increasing living standards”.
This conviction that raising the standards of living was the best method of checking Communism now inspired President Kennedy’s bold proposal for the creation of the alliance for progress - a ten-year plan designed to do for Latin America what Marshall Plan had done for Western Europe. It was to be “a peaceful revolution on a hemispheric scale, a vast co-operative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work, land, health, and schools. “To achieve this, the United States pleaded an initial grant of one billion dollars, with the promise of additional billions for the future.
If American policy towards Europe in the postwar years had been a conspicuous success, and towards Asia a disappointing balance between success and failure, it could be said that the most conspicuous thing about relations with Latin America was the absence of any policy. Franklin Roosevelt, to be sure, had launched a “Good Neighbour” policy, but being a good neighbour was, it seemed, a negative rather than a positive affair, a matter of keeping hands off, of making the Monroe Doctrine, in form at least, multilateral. All through the postwar years, the states of Latin America, Mexico and Chile were partial exceptions, they were in the throes of major economic and social crisis. Population was growing faster than in any other part of the globe, without a comparable increase in wealth or productivity; the gap between the poor and the rich was widening; and as the rich and powerful turned to the military for the preservation of order and privilege, the poor turned to revolution.
Deeply involved in other quarters of the globe, the United States paid little attention to the fortunes or misfortunes of her neighbours to the south, and when she did intervene, it appeared to be on the side of order and the status quo rather than on the side of reform. So frightened was the United States of “Communism” in Latin America that it preferred a military dictatorship to reformers who might drift too far to the “left”, and sustained a Batista in Cuba, a Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, a Peron in Argentina, and a Jimenez in Venezuela.
In his last two years, President Eisenhower had tried to mend his Latin American fences. Though rejecting a Brazilian proposal of a Marshall Plan for Latin America, he did take the initiative in setting up an Inter- American Development Bank with a capital of one billion dollars, almost half of it supplied by the United States. Other government investments in Latin America ran to some four million dollars, while private investments exceeded nine billion. Yet though to most Americans, all this seemed a form of economic aid, many Latin Americans regarded it as economic imperialism. In September 1960, came a co-operative plan that could not be regarded as other than enlightened: the Act of Bogota, which authorized a grant of half a billion dollars to subsidize not only economic but social and educational progress in Latin America. “We are not saints”, said President Eisenhower when he visited Santiago de Chile, “We know we make mistakes, but our heart is in the right place”.
But was it? President Kennedy was confronted by the same dilemma that had perplexed his predecessors. Clearly, it was essential to provide a large-scale aid to the countries south of Rio Grande, but should this aid go to bolster up established regimes and thus help maintain status quo, or should it be used to speed up social reforms, even at the risk of revolt? As early as 1958, the then Senator Kennedy had asserted that “the objective of our aid program in Latin America should not be to purchase allies, but to consolidate a free and democratic Western Hemisphere, alleviating those conditions which might foster opportunities for communistic infiltration and unite our people on the basis of constantly increasing living standards”.
This conviction that raising the standards of living was the best method of checking Communism now inspired President Kennedy’s bold proposal for the creation of the alliance for progress - a ten-year plan designed to do for Latin America what Marshall Plan had done for Western Europe. It was to be “a peaceful revolution on a hemispheric scale, a vast co-operative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work, land, health, and schools. “To achieve this, the United States pleaded an initial grant of one billion dollars, with the promise of additional billions for the future.
Following World War II, which of the following problems was the United States most concerned with regarding Latin America?
Question 2
Direction: Read the passage carefully and answer the questions that follow.
If American policy towards Europe in the postwar years had been a conspicuous success, and towards Asia a disappointing balance between success and failure, it could be said that the most conspicuous thing about relations with Latin America was the absence of any policy. Franklin Roosevelt, to be sure, had launched a “Good Neighbour” policy, but being a good neighbour was, it seemed, a negative rather than a positive affair, a matter of keeping hands off, of making the Monroe Doctrine, in form at least, multilateral. All through the postwar years, the states of Latin America, Mexico and Chile were partial exceptions, they were in the throes of major economic and social crisis. Population was growing faster than in any other part of the globe, without a comparable increase in wealth or productivity; the gap between the poor and the rich was widening; and as the rich and powerful turned to the military for the preservation of order and privilege, the poor turned to revolution.
Deeply involved in other quarters of the globe, the United States paid little attention to the fortunes or misfortunes of her neighbours to the south, and when she did intervene, it appeared to be on the side of order and the status quo rather than on the side of reform. So frightened was the United States of “Communism” in Latin America that it preferred a military dictatorship to reformers who might drift too far to the “left”, and sustained a Batista in Cuba, a Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, a Peron in Argentina, and a Jimenez in Venezuela.
In his last two years, President Eisenhower had tried to mend his Latin American fences. Though rejecting a Brazilian proposal of a Marshall Plan for Latin America, he did take the initiative in setting up an Inter- American Development Bank with a capital of one billion dollars, almost half of it supplied by the United States. Other government investments in Latin America ran to some four million dollars, while private investments exceeded nine billion. Yet though to most Americans, all this seemed a form of economic aid, many Latin Americans regarded it as economic imperialism. In September 1960, came a co-operative plan that could not be regarded as other than enlightened: the Act of Bogota, which authorized a grant of half a billion dollars to subsidize not only economic but social and educational progress in Latin America. “We are not saints”, said President Eisenhower when he visited Santiago de Chile, “We know we make mistakes, but our heart is in the right place”.
But was it? President Kennedy was confronted by the same dilemma that had perplexed his predecessors. Clearly, it was essential to provide a large-scale aid to the countries south of Rio Grande, but should this aid go to bolster up established regimes and thus help maintain status quo, or should it be used to speed up social reforms, even at the risk of revolt? As early as 1958, the then Senator Kennedy had asserted that “the objective of our aid program in Latin America should not be to purchase allies, but to consolidate a free and democratic Western Hemisphere, alleviating those conditions which might foster opportunities for communistic infiltration and unite our people on the basis of constantly increasing living standards”.
This conviction that raising the standards of living was the best method of checking Communism now inspired President Kennedy’s bold proposal for the creation of the alliance for progress - a ten-year plan designed to do for Latin America what Marshall Plan had done for Western Europe. It was to be “a peaceful revolution on a hemispheric scale, a vast co-operative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work, land, health, and schools. “To achieve this, the United States pleaded an initial grant of one billion dollars, with the promise of additional billions for the future.
If American policy towards Europe in the postwar years had been a conspicuous success, and towards Asia a disappointing balance between success and failure, it could be said that the most conspicuous thing about relations with Latin America was the absence of any policy. Franklin Roosevelt, to be sure, had launched a “Good Neighbour” policy, but being a good neighbour was, it seemed, a negative rather than a positive affair, a matter of keeping hands off, of making the Monroe Doctrine, in form at least, multilateral. All through the postwar years, the states of Latin America, Mexico and Chile were partial exceptions, they were in the throes of major economic and social crisis. Population was growing faster than in any other part of the globe, without a comparable increase in wealth or productivity; the gap between the poor and the rich was widening; and as the rich and powerful turned to the military for the preservation of order and privilege, the poor turned to revolution.
Deeply involved in other quarters of the globe, the United States paid little attention to the fortunes or misfortunes of her neighbours to the south, and when she did intervene, it appeared to be on the side of order and the status quo rather than on the side of reform. So frightened was the United States of “Communism” in Latin America that it preferred a military dictatorship to reformers who might drift too far to the “left”, and sustained a Batista in Cuba, a Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, a Peron in Argentina, and a Jimenez in Venezuela.
In his last two years, President Eisenhower had tried to mend his Latin American fences. Though rejecting a Brazilian proposal of a Marshall Plan for Latin America, he did take the initiative in setting up an Inter- American Development Bank with a capital of one billion dollars, almost half of it supplied by the United States. Other government investments in Latin America ran to some four million dollars, while private investments exceeded nine billion. Yet though to most Americans, all this seemed a form of economic aid, many Latin Americans regarded it as economic imperialism. In September 1960, came a co-operative plan that could not be regarded as other than enlightened: the Act of Bogota, which authorized a grant of half a billion dollars to subsidize not only economic but social and educational progress in Latin America. “We are not saints”, said President Eisenhower when he visited Santiago de Chile, “We know we make mistakes, but our heart is in the right place”.
But was it? President Kennedy was confronted by the same dilemma that had perplexed his predecessors. Clearly, it was essential to provide a large-scale aid to the countries south of Rio Grande, but should this aid go to bolster up established regimes and thus help maintain status quo, or should it be used to speed up social reforms, even at the risk of revolt? As early as 1958, the then Senator Kennedy had asserted that “the objective of our aid program in Latin America should not be to purchase allies, but to consolidate a free and democratic Western Hemisphere, alleviating those conditions which might foster opportunities for communistic infiltration and unite our people on the basis of constantly increasing living standards”.
This conviction that raising the standards of living was the best method of checking Communism now inspired President Kennedy’s bold proposal for the creation of the alliance for progress - a ten-year plan designed to do for Latin America what Marshall Plan had done for Western Europe. It was to be “a peaceful revolution on a hemispheric scale, a vast co-operative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work, land, health, and schools. “To achieve this, the United States pleaded an initial grant of one billion dollars, with the promise of additional billions for the future.
Which of the following can be counted as the key reason for the rejection of the Inter-American Development Bank by the Latin Americans?
Question 3
Direction: Read the passage carefully and answer the questions that follow.
If American policy towards Europe in the postwar years had been a conspicuous success, and towards Asia a disappointing balance between success and failure, it could be said that the most conspicuous thing about relations with Latin America was the absence of any policy. Franklin Roosevelt, to be sure, had launched a “Good Neighbour” policy, but being a good neighbour was, it seemed, a negative rather than a positive affair, a matter of keeping hands off, of making the Monroe Doctrine, in form at least, multilateral. All through the postwar years, the states of Latin America, Mexico and Chile were partial exceptions, they were in the throes of major economic and social crisis. Population was growing faster than in any other part of the globe, without a comparable increase in wealth or productivity; the gap between the poor and the rich was widening; and as the rich and powerful turned to the military for the preservation of order and privilege, the poor turned to revolution.
Deeply involved in other quarters of the globe, the United States paid little attention to the fortunes or misfortunes of her neighbours to the south, and when she did intervene, it appeared to be on the side of order and the status quo rather than on the side of reform. So frightened was the United States of “Communism” in Latin America that it preferred a military dictatorship to reformers who might drift too far to the “left”, and sustained a Batista in Cuba, a Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, a Peron in Argentina, and a Jimenez in Venezuela.
In his last two years, President Eisenhower had tried to mend his Latin American fences. Though rejecting a Brazilian proposal of a Marshall Plan for Latin America, he did take the initiative in setting up an Inter- American Development Bank with a capital of one billion dollars, almost half of it supplied by the United States. Other government investments in Latin America ran to some four million dollars, while private investments exceeded nine billion. Yet though to most Americans, all this seemed a form of economic aid, many Latin Americans regarded it as economic imperialism. In September 1960, came a co-operative plan that could not be regarded as other than enlightened: the Act of Bogota, which authorized a grant of half a billion dollars to subsidize not only economic but social and educational progress in Latin America. “We are not saints”, said President Eisenhower when he visited Santiago de Chile, “We know we make mistakes, but our heart is in the right place”.
But was it? President Kennedy was confronted by the same dilemma that had perplexed his predecessors. Clearly, it was essential to provide a large-scale aid to the countries south of Rio Grande, but should this aid go to bolster up established regimes and thus help maintain status quo, or should it be used to speed up social reforms, even at the risk of revolt? As early as 1958, the then Senator Kennedy had asserted that “the objective of our aid program in Latin America should not be to purchase allies, but to consolidate a free and democratic Western Hemisphere, alleviating those conditions which might foster opportunities for communistic infiltration and unite our people on the basis of constantly increasing living standards”.
This conviction that raising the standards of living was the best method of checking Communism now inspired President Kennedy’s bold proposal for the creation of the alliance for progress - a ten-year plan designed to do for Latin America what Marshall Plan had done for Western Europe. It was to be “a peaceful revolution on a hemispheric scale, a vast co-operative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work, land, health, and schools. “To achieve this, the United States pleaded an initial grant of one billion dollars, with the promise of additional billions for the future.
If American policy towards Europe in the postwar years had been a conspicuous success, and towards Asia a disappointing balance between success and failure, it could be said that the most conspicuous thing about relations with Latin America was the absence of any policy. Franklin Roosevelt, to be sure, had launched a “Good Neighbour” policy, but being a good neighbour was, it seemed, a negative rather than a positive affair, a matter of keeping hands off, of making the Monroe Doctrine, in form at least, multilateral. All through the postwar years, the states of Latin America, Mexico and Chile were partial exceptions, they were in the throes of major economic and social crisis. Population was growing faster than in any other part of the globe, without a comparable increase in wealth or productivity; the gap between the poor and the rich was widening; and as the rich and powerful turned to the military for the preservation of order and privilege, the poor turned to revolution.
Deeply involved in other quarters of the globe, the United States paid little attention to the fortunes or misfortunes of her neighbours to the south, and when she did intervene, it appeared to be on the side of order and the status quo rather than on the side of reform. So frightened was the United States of “Communism” in Latin America that it preferred a military dictatorship to reformers who might drift too far to the “left”, and sustained a Batista in Cuba, a Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, a Peron in Argentina, and a Jimenez in Venezuela.
In his last two years, President Eisenhower had tried to mend his Latin American fences. Though rejecting a Brazilian proposal of a Marshall Plan for Latin America, he did take the initiative in setting up an Inter- American Development Bank with a capital of one billion dollars, almost half of it supplied by the United States. Other government investments in Latin America ran to some four million dollars, while private investments exceeded nine billion. Yet though to most Americans, all this seemed a form of economic aid, many Latin Americans regarded it as economic imperialism. In September 1960, came a co-operative plan that could not be regarded as other than enlightened: the Act of Bogota, which authorized a grant of half a billion dollars to subsidize not only economic but social and educational progress in Latin America. “We are not saints”, said President Eisenhower when he visited Santiago de Chile, “We know we make mistakes, but our heart is in the right place”.
But was it? President Kennedy was confronted by the same dilemma that had perplexed his predecessors. Clearly, it was essential to provide a large-scale aid to the countries south of Rio Grande, but should this aid go to bolster up established regimes and thus help maintain status quo, or should it be used to speed up social reforms, even at the risk of revolt? As early as 1958, the then Senator Kennedy had asserted that “the objective of our aid program in Latin America should not be to purchase allies, but to consolidate a free and democratic Western Hemisphere, alleviating those conditions which might foster opportunities for communistic infiltration and unite our people on the basis of constantly increasing living standards”.
This conviction that raising the standards of living was the best method of checking Communism now inspired President Kennedy’s bold proposal for the creation of the alliance for progress - a ten-year plan designed to do for Latin America what Marshall Plan had done for Western Europe. It was to be “a peaceful revolution on a hemispheric scale, a vast co-operative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work, land, health, and schools. “To achieve this, the United States pleaded an initial grant of one billion dollars, with the promise of additional billions for the future.
Which of the following is most closely associated with the concept of a Marshall Plan for Latin America?
Question 4
Direction: Read the passage carefully and answer the questions that follow.
If American policy towards Europe in the postwar years had been a conspicuous success, and towards Asia a disappointing balance between success and failure, it could be said that the most conspicuous thing about relations with Latin America was the absence of any policy. Franklin Roosevelt, to be sure, had launched a “Good Neighbour” policy, but being a good neighbour was, it seemed, a negative rather than a positive affair, a matter of keeping hands off, of making the Monroe Doctrine, in form at least, multilateral. All through the postwar years, the states of Latin America, Mexico and Chile were partial exceptions, they were in the throes of major economic and social crisis. Population was growing faster than in any other part of the globe, without a comparable increase in wealth or productivity; the gap between the poor and the rich was widening; and as the rich and powerful turned to the military for the preservation of order and privilege, the poor turned to revolution.
Deeply involved in other quarters of the globe, the United States paid little attention to the fortunes or misfortunes of her neighbours to the south, and when she did intervene, it appeared to be on the side of order and the status quo rather than on the side of reform. So frightened was the United States of “Communism” in Latin America that it preferred a military dictatorship to reformers who might drift too far to the “left”, and sustained a Batista in Cuba, a Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, a Peron in Argentina, and a Jimenez in Venezuela.
In his last two years, President Eisenhower had tried to mend his Latin American fences. Though rejecting a Brazilian proposal of a Marshall Plan for Latin America, he did take the initiative in setting up an Inter- American Development Bank with a capital of one billion dollars, almost half of it supplied by the United States. Other government investments in Latin America ran to some four million dollars, while private investments exceeded nine billion. Yet though to most Americans, all this seemed a form of economic aid, many Latin Americans regarded it as economic imperialism. In September 1960, came a co-operative plan that could not be regarded as other than enlightened: the Act of Bogota, which authorized a grant of half a billion dollars to subsidize not only economic but social and educational progress in Latin America. “We are not saints”, said President Eisenhower when he visited Santiago de Chile, “We know we make mistakes, but our heart is in the right place”.
But was it? President Kennedy was confronted by the same dilemma that had perplexed his predecessors. Clearly, it was essential to provide a large-scale aid to the countries south of Rio Grande, but should this aid go to bolster up established regimes and thus help maintain status quo, or should it be used to speed up social reforms, even at the risk of revolt? As early as 1958, the then Senator Kennedy had asserted that “the objective of our aid program in Latin America should not be to purchase allies, but to consolidate a free and democratic Western Hemisphere, alleviating those conditions which might foster opportunities for communistic infiltration and unite our people on the basis of constantly increasing living standards”.
This conviction that raising the standards of living was the best method of checking Communism now inspired President Kennedy’s bold proposal for the creation of the alliance for progress - a ten-year plan designed to do for Latin America what Marshall Plan had done for Western Europe. It was to be “a peaceful revolution on a hemispheric scale, a vast co-operative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work, land, health, and schools. “To achieve this, the United States pleaded an initial grant of one billion dollars, with the promise of additional billions for the future.
If American policy towards Europe in the postwar years had been a conspicuous success, and towards Asia a disappointing balance between success and failure, it could be said that the most conspicuous thing about relations with Latin America was the absence of any policy. Franklin Roosevelt, to be sure, had launched a “Good Neighbour” policy, but being a good neighbour was, it seemed, a negative rather than a positive affair, a matter of keeping hands off, of making the Monroe Doctrine, in form at least, multilateral. All through the postwar years, the states of Latin America, Mexico and Chile were partial exceptions, they were in the throes of major economic and social crisis. Population was growing faster than in any other part of the globe, without a comparable increase in wealth or productivity; the gap between the poor and the rich was widening; and as the rich and powerful turned to the military for the preservation of order and privilege, the poor turned to revolution.
Deeply involved in other quarters of the globe, the United States paid little attention to the fortunes or misfortunes of her neighbours to the south, and when she did intervene, it appeared to be on the side of order and the status quo rather than on the side of reform. So frightened was the United States of “Communism” in Latin America that it preferred a military dictatorship to reformers who might drift too far to the “left”, and sustained a Batista in Cuba, a Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, a Peron in Argentina, and a Jimenez in Venezuela.
In his last two years, President Eisenhower had tried to mend his Latin American fences. Though rejecting a Brazilian proposal of a Marshall Plan for Latin America, he did take the initiative in setting up an Inter- American Development Bank with a capital of one billion dollars, almost half of it supplied by the United States. Other government investments in Latin America ran to some four million dollars, while private investments exceeded nine billion. Yet though to most Americans, all this seemed a form of economic aid, many Latin Americans regarded it as economic imperialism. In September 1960, came a co-operative plan that could not be regarded as other than enlightened: the Act of Bogota, which authorized a grant of half a billion dollars to subsidize not only economic but social and educational progress in Latin America. “We are not saints”, said President Eisenhower when he visited Santiago de Chile, “We know we make mistakes, but our heart is in the right place”.
But was it? President Kennedy was confronted by the same dilemma that had perplexed his predecessors. Clearly, it was essential to provide a large-scale aid to the countries south of Rio Grande, but should this aid go to bolster up established regimes and thus help maintain status quo, or should it be used to speed up social reforms, even at the risk of revolt? As early as 1958, the then Senator Kennedy had asserted that “the objective of our aid program in Latin America should not be to purchase allies, but to consolidate a free and democratic Western Hemisphere, alleviating those conditions which might foster opportunities for communistic infiltration and unite our people on the basis of constantly increasing living standards”.
This conviction that raising the standards of living was the best method of checking Communism now inspired President Kennedy’s bold proposal for the creation of the alliance for progress - a ten-year plan designed to do for Latin America what Marshall Plan had done for Western Europe. It was to be “a peaceful revolution on a hemispheric scale, a vast co-operative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work, land, health, and schools. “To achieve this, the United States pleaded an initial grant of one billion dollars, with the promise of additional billions for the future.
Which of the following statements is not true as according to the passage?
Question 5
Direction: Read the passage carefully and answer the questions that follow.
If American policy towards Europe in the postwar years had been a conspicuous success, and towards Asia a disappointing balance between success and failure, it could be said that the most conspicuous thing about relations with Latin America was the absence of any policy. Franklin Roosevelt, to be sure, had launched a “Good Neighbour” policy, but being a good neighbour was, it seemed, a negative rather than a positive affair, a matter of keeping hands off, of making the Monroe Doctrine, in form at least, multilateral. All through the postwar years, the states of Latin America, Mexico and Chile were partial exceptions, they were in the throes of major economic and social crisis. Population was growing faster than in any other part of the globe, without a comparable increase in wealth or productivity; the gap between the poor and the rich was widening; and as the rich and powerful turned to the military for the preservation of order and privilege, the poor turned to revolution.
Deeply involved in other quarters of the globe, the United States paid little attention to the fortunes or misfortunes of her neighbours to the south, and when she did intervene, it appeared to be on the side of order and the status quo rather than on the side of reform. So frightened was the United States of “Communism” in Latin America that it preferred a military dictatorship to reformers who might drift too far to the “left”, and sustained a Batista in Cuba, a Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, a Peron in Argentina, and a Jimenez in Venezuela.
In his last two years, President Eisenhower had tried to mend his Latin American fences. Though rejecting a Brazilian proposal of a Marshall Plan for Latin America, he did take the initiative in setting up an Inter- American Development Bank with a capital of one billion dollars, almost half of it supplied by the United States. Other government investments in Latin America ran to some four million dollars, while private investments exceeded nine billion. Yet though to most Americans, all this seemed a form of economic aid, many Latin Americans regarded it as economic imperialism. In September 1960, came a co-operative plan that could not be regarded as other than enlightened: the Act of Bogota, which authorized a grant of half a billion dollars to subsidize not only economic but social and educational progress in Latin America. “We are not saints”, said President Eisenhower when he visited Santiago de Chile, “We know we make mistakes, but our heart is in the right place”.
But was it? President Kennedy was confronted by the same dilemma that had perplexed his predecessors. Clearly, it was essential to provide a large-scale aid to the countries south of Rio Grande, but should this aid go to bolster up established regimes and thus help maintain status quo, or should it be used to speed up social reforms, even at the risk of revolt? As early as 1958, the then Senator Kennedy had asserted that “the objective of our aid program in Latin America should not be to purchase allies, but to consolidate a free and democratic Western Hemisphere, alleviating those conditions which might foster opportunities for communistic infiltration and unite our people on the basis of constantly increasing living standards”.
This conviction that raising the standards of living was the best method of checking Communism now inspired President Kennedy’s bold proposal for the creation of the alliance for progress - a ten-year plan designed to do for Latin America what Marshall Plan had done for Western Europe. It was to be “a peaceful revolution on a hemispheric scale, a vast co-operative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work, land, health, and schools. “To achieve this, the United States pleaded an initial grant of one billion dollars, with the promise of additional billions for the future.
If American policy towards Europe in the postwar years had been a conspicuous success, and towards Asia a disappointing balance between success and failure, it could be said that the most conspicuous thing about relations with Latin America was the absence of any policy. Franklin Roosevelt, to be sure, had launched a “Good Neighbour” policy, but being a good neighbour was, it seemed, a negative rather than a positive affair, a matter of keeping hands off, of making the Monroe Doctrine, in form at least, multilateral. All through the postwar years, the states of Latin America, Mexico and Chile were partial exceptions, they were in the throes of major economic and social crisis. Population was growing faster than in any other part of the globe, without a comparable increase in wealth or productivity; the gap between the poor and the rich was widening; and as the rich and powerful turned to the military for the preservation of order and privilege, the poor turned to revolution.
Deeply involved in other quarters of the globe, the United States paid little attention to the fortunes or misfortunes of her neighbours to the south, and when she did intervene, it appeared to be on the side of order and the status quo rather than on the side of reform. So frightened was the United States of “Communism” in Latin America that it preferred a military dictatorship to reformers who might drift too far to the “left”, and sustained a Batista in Cuba, a Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, a Peron in Argentina, and a Jimenez in Venezuela.
In his last two years, President Eisenhower had tried to mend his Latin American fences. Though rejecting a Brazilian proposal of a Marshall Plan for Latin America, he did take the initiative in setting up an Inter- American Development Bank with a capital of one billion dollars, almost half of it supplied by the United States. Other government investments in Latin America ran to some four million dollars, while private investments exceeded nine billion. Yet though to most Americans, all this seemed a form of economic aid, many Latin Americans regarded it as economic imperialism. In September 1960, came a co-operative plan that could not be regarded as other than enlightened: the Act of Bogota, which authorized a grant of half a billion dollars to subsidize not only economic but social and educational progress in Latin America. “We are not saints”, said President Eisenhower when he visited Santiago de Chile, “We know we make mistakes, but our heart is in the right place”.
But was it? President Kennedy was confronted by the same dilemma that had perplexed his predecessors. Clearly, it was essential to provide a large-scale aid to the countries south of Rio Grande, but should this aid go to bolster up established regimes and thus help maintain status quo, or should it be used to speed up social reforms, even at the risk of revolt? As early as 1958, the then Senator Kennedy had asserted that “the objective of our aid program in Latin America should not be to purchase allies, but to consolidate a free and democratic Western Hemisphere, alleviating those conditions which might foster opportunities for communistic infiltration and unite our people on the basis of constantly increasing living standards”.
This conviction that raising the standards of living was the best method of checking Communism now inspired President Kennedy’s bold proposal for the creation of the alliance for progress - a ten-year plan designed to do for Latin America what Marshall Plan had done for Western Europe. It was to be “a peaceful revolution on a hemispheric scale, a vast co-operative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work, land, health, and schools. “To achieve this, the United States pleaded an initial grant of one billion dollars, with the promise of additional billions for the future.
Which of the following inferences can be drawn if everything said in the passage were assumed to be true?
Question 6
Directions: In the following question two equations numbered I and II are given. You have to solve both the equations and answer the question.
I. x2 – 23x – 288 = 0
II. y2 + 2y – 224 = 0
II. y2 + 2y – 224 = 0
Question 7
Directions: In the following question two equations numbered I and II are given. You have to solve both the equations and answer the question.
I. x2 – 8x – 240 = 0
II. y2 + 7y – 144 = 0
II. y2 + 7y – 144 = 0
Question 8
Direction: In the following question two equations numbered I and II are given. You have to solve both the equations and answer the question.
I. 7x2 + 53x – 90 = 0
II. 8y2 – 61y + 78 = 0
II. 8y2 – 61y + 78 = 0
Question 9
Direction: In the following question two equations are given in variables X and Y. You have to solve these equations and determine relation between X and Y.
I. 2x2 – 35x – 147 = 0
II. 3y2 + 40y + 117 = 0
II. 3y2 + 40y + 117 = 0
Question 10
Directions: In the following question two equations numbered I and II are given. You have to solve both the equations and answer the question.
I. x2 + 9x – 486 = 0
II. y2 – 40y + 396 = 0
II. y2 – 40y + 396 = 0
Question 11
Direction: Study the following information to answer the given questions:
Eight members of a family with three generations are sitting around a circular table facing the centre. The members are M, N, O, P, Q, R, S and T. There are three married couples in the family with one couple has two sons, one has two daughters and one has no child. The only males in the family are N, P and Q. No two males are sitting adjacent to each other.
Both the sons of O are married. R, the grandchild of N is sitting to the immediate left of Q. M’s daughter S is sitting opposite to her aunt T. T is sitting second to the left of Q. P is sitting to the immediate right of his wife. M does not have a female neighbour.
Eight members of a family with three generations are sitting around a circular table facing the centre. The members are M, N, O, P, Q, R, S and T. There are three married couples in the family with one couple has two sons, one has two daughters and one has no child. The only males in the family are N, P and Q. No two males are sitting adjacent to each other.
Both the sons of O are married. R, the grandchild of N is sitting to the immediate left of Q. M’s daughter S is sitting opposite to her aunt T. T is sitting second to the left of Q. P is sitting to the immediate right of his wife. M does not have a female neighbour.
Who is the mother of R?
Question 12
Direction: Study the following information to answer the given questions:
Eight members of a family with three generations are sitting around a circular table facing the centre. The members are M, N, O, P, Q, R, S and T. There are three married couples in the family with one couple has two sons, one has two daughters and one has no child. The only males in the family are N, P and Q. No two males are sitting adjacent to each other.
Both the sons of O are married. R, the grandchild of N is sitting to the immediate left of Q. M’s daughter S is sitting opposite to her aunt T. T is sitting second to the left of Q. P is sitting to the immediate right of his wife. M does not have a female neighbour.
Eight members of a family with three generations are sitting around a circular table facing the centre. The members are M, N, O, P, Q, R, S and T. There are three married couples in the family with one couple has two sons, one has two daughters and one has no child. The only males in the family are N, P and Q. No two males are sitting adjacent to each other.
Both the sons of O are married. R, the grandchild of N is sitting to the immediate left of Q. M’s daughter S is sitting opposite to her aunt T. T is sitting second to the left of Q. P is sitting to the immediate right of his wife. M does not have a female neighbour.
How many persons are sitting between Q and S when counted from Q in anti-clockwise direction?
Question 13
Direction: Study the following information to answer the given questions:
Eight members of a family with three generations are sitting around a circular table facing the centre. The members are M, N, O, P, Q, R, S and T. There are three married couples in the family with one couple has two sons, one has two daughters and one has no child. The only males in the family are N, P and Q. No two males are sitting adjacent to each other.
Both the sons of O are married. R, the grandchild of N is sitting to the immediate left of Q. M’s daughter S is sitting opposite to her aunt T. T is sitting second to the left of Q. P is sitting to the immediate right of his wife. M does not have a female neighbour.
Eight members of a family with three generations are sitting around a circular table facing the centre. The members are M, N, O, P, Q, R, S and T. There are three married couples in the family with one couple has two sons, one has two daughters and one has no child. The only males in the family are N, P and Q. No two males are sitting adjacent to each other.
Both the sons of O are married. R, the grandchild of N is sitting to the immediate left of Q. M’s daughter S is sitting opposite to her aunt T. T is sitting second to the left of Q. P is sitting to the immediate right of his wife. M does not have a female neighbour.
Who is sitting opposite to the sister of S?
Question 14
Direction: Study the following information to answer the given questions:
Eight members of a family with three generations are sitting around a circular table facing the centre. The members are M, N, O, P, Q, R, S and T. There are three married couples in the family with one couple has two sons, one has two daughters and one has no child. The only males in the family are N, P and Q. No two males are sitting adjacent to each other.
Both the sons of O are married. R, the grandchild of N is sitting to the immediate left of Q. M’s daughter S is sitting opposite to her aunt T. T is sitting second to the left of Q. P is sitting to the immediate right of his wife. M does not have a female neighbour.
Eight members of a family with three generations are sitting around a circular table facing the centre. The members are M, N, O, P, Q, R, S and T. There are three married couples in the family with one couple has two sons, one has two daughters and one has no child. The only males in the family are N, P and Q. No two males are sitting adjacent to each other.
Both the sons of O are married. R, the grandchild of N is sitting to the immediate left of Q. M’s daughter S is sitting opposite to her aunt T. T is sitting second to the left of Q. P is sitting to the immediate right of his wife. M does not have a female neighbour.
Who among the following is not married?
Question 15
Direction: Study the following information to answer the given questions:
Eight members of a family with three generations are sitting around a circular table facing the centre. The members are M, N, O, P, Q, R, S and T. There are three married couples in the family with one couple has two sons, one has two daughters and one has no child. The only males in the family are N, P and Q. No two males are sitting adjacent to each other.
Both the sons of O are married. R, the grandchild of N is sitting to the immediate left of Q. M’s daughter S is sitting opposite to her aunt T. T is sitting second to the left of Q. P is sitting to the immediate right of his wife. M does not have a female neighbour.
Eight members of a family with three generations are sitting around a circular table facing the centre. The members are M, N, O, P, Q, R, S and T. There are three married couples in the family with one couple has two sons, one has two daughters and one has no child. The only males in the family are N, P and Q. No two males are sitting adjacent to each other.
Both the sons of O are married. R, the grandchild of N is sitting to the immediate left of Q. M’s daughter S is sitting opposite to her aunt T. T is sitting second to the left of Q. P is sitting to the immediate right of his wife. M does not have a female neighbour.
What is position of O with respect to T?
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Jun 15PO, Clerk, SO, Insurance
