CLAT 2021 || Passage Based Current Affairs Quiz || 29.06.2020

The “A” Law is a very unique Indian feature. In the British parliament, for instance, MPs who defy the party whip often lose party membership, but not their seat in parliament. In America, Congressmen have often voted against their own party throughout history. Senator John McCain differed with “X” and his fellow Republicans as much as 17 percent of the time during votes in the Senate. There are several reasons why many democracies have not adopted an “A” law. If Members are able to vote on laws independently, they would act as an effective check on the government. What’s more, Members will also ensure democratic debate in the public domain before laws are passed – because they will be personally accountable to their constituents for their vote. The “A” Law, in effect, dilutes the separation of powers between the “Y” and the “Z” – and centralises power in the hands of the cabinet. In the parliamentary system, the independence of lawmakers is doubly important, given that the “Y” is a part of the Legislature and the separation of powers between the two is weaker. Independence will also have other benefits: Since lawmakers can now vote independently in the House, voters will elect the candidate who would best represent their local interests, regardless of their party. Over time, this means that parties would have to field candidates with stronger credibility at the grassroots, rather than those merely loyal to the party leadership. All of this makes a strong case for India to amend the “A” Law, in order to give elected lawmakers more independence to stand up for their constituencies. But the concern over political instability and quid-pro-quo deals is still valid. One possible solution would be to disqualify Members only if they vote against their party whip during important events such as no-confidence motions. On all other matters, Members ought to be given full independence to vote as they choose. Such an amended “A” Law can also counter the scourge of mass resignations from the House – a key cause of political instability in “B” and “C”. Under the status quo, no law can reasonably prevent a lawmaker from resigning: Some lawmakers may feel compelled to resign from the House, owing to genuine dissent against their party. To prevent Members from mass resigning in order to switch parties under a quid-pro-quo deal, the amended “A” Law should forbid a resigning Member from being re-elected during the by-election that follows immediately after their resignation. The “A” Law has created a democracy of parties and numbers in India, rather than a democracy of debate and discussion. Lawmaking is increasingly driven, not by the compulsive force of a party’s argument, but by the brute force of a party’s numbers in the legislature. Change is long overdue.

The “A” Law is a very unique Indian feature. In the British parliament, for instance, MPs who defy the party whip often lose party membership, but not their seat in parliament. In America, Congressmen have often voted against their own party throughout history. Senator John McCain differed with “X” and his fellow Republicans as much as 17 percent of the time during votes in the Senate. There are several reasons why many democracies have not adopted an “A” law. If Members are able to vote on laws independently, they would act as an effective check on the government. What’s more, Members will also ensure democratic debate in the public domain before laws are passed – because they will be personally accountable to their constituents for their vote. The “A” Law, in effect, dilutes the separation of powers between the “Y” and the “Z” – and centralises power in the hands of the cabinet. In the parliamentary system, the independence of lawmakers is doubly important, given that the “Y” is a part of the Legislature and the separation of powers between the two is weaker. Independence will also have other benefits: Since lawmakers can now vote independently in the House, voters will elect the candidate who would best represent their local interests, regardless of their party. Over time, this means that parties would have to field candidates with stronger credibility at the grassroots, rather than those merely loyal to the party leadership. All of this makes a strong case for India to amend the “A” Law, in order to give elected lawmakers more independence to stand up for their constituencies. But the concern over political instability and quid-pro-quo deals is still valid. One possible solution would be to disqualify Members only if they vote against their party whip during important events such as no-confidence motions. On all other matters, Members ought to be given full independence to vote as they choose. Such an amended “A” Law can also counter the scourge of mass resignations from the House – a key cause of political instability in “B” and “C”. Under the status quo, no law can reasonably prevent a lawmaker from resigning: Some lawmakers may feel compelled to resign from the House, owing to genuine dissent against their party. To prevent Members from mass resigning in order to switch parties under a quid-pro-quo deal, the amended “A” Law should forbid a resigning Member from being re-elected during the by-election that follows immediately after their resignation. The “A” Law has created a democracy of parties and numbers in India, rather than a democracy of debate and discussion. Lawmaking is increasingly driven, not by the compulsive force of a party’s argument, but by the brute force of a party’s numbers in the legislature. Change is long overdue.

The “A” Law is a very unique Indian feature. In the British parliament, for instance, MPs who defy the party whip often lose party membership, but not their seat in parliament. In America, Congressmen have often voted against their own party throughout history. Senator John McCain differed with “X” and his fellow Republicans as much as 17 percent of the time during votes in the Senate. There are several reasons why many democracies have not adopted an “A” law. If Members are able to vote on laws independently, they would act as an effective check on the government. What’s more, Members will also ensure democratic debate in the public domain before laws are passed – because they will be personally accountable to their constituents for their vote. The “A” Law, in effect, dilutes the separation of powers between the “Y” and the “Z” – and centralises power in the hands of the cabinet. In the parliamentary system, the independence of lawmakers is doubly important, given that the “Y” is a part of the Legislature and the separation of powers between the two is weaker. Independence will also have other benefits: Since lawmakers can now vote independently in the House, voters will elect the candidate who would best represent their local interests, regardless of their party. Over time, this means that parties would have to field candidates with stronger credibility at the grassroots, rather than those merely loyal to the party leadership. All of this makes a strong case for India to amend the “A” Law, in order to give elected lawmakers more independence to stand up for their constituencies. But the concern over political instability and quid-pro-quo deals is still valid. One possible solution would be to disqualify Members only if they vote against their party whip during important events such as no-confidence motions. On all other matters, Members ought to be given full independence to vote as they choose. Such an amended “A” Law can also counter the scourge of mass resignations from the House – a key cause of political instability in “B” and “C”. Under the status quo, no law can reasonably prevent a lawmaker from resigning: Some lawmakers may feel compelled to resign from the House, owing to genuine dissent against their party. To prevent Members from mass resigning in order to switch parties under a quid-pro-quo deal, the amended “A” Law should forbid a resigning Member from being re-elected during the by-election that follows immediately after their resignation. The “A” Law has created a democracy of parties and numbers in India, rather than a democracy of debate and discussion. Lawmaking is increasingly driven, not by the compulsive force of a party’s argument, but by the brute force of a party’s numbers in the legislature. Change is long overdue.

The “A” Law is a very unique Indian feature. In the British parliament, for instance, MPs who defy the party whip often lose party membership, but not their seat in parliament. In America, Congressmen have often voted against their own party throughout history. Senator John McCain differed with “X” and his fellow Republicans as much as 17 percent of the time during votes in the Senate. There are several reasons why many democracies have not adopted an “A” law. If Members are able to vote on laws independently, they would act as an effective check on the government. What’s more, Members will also ensure democratic debate in the public domain before laws are passed – because they will be personally accountable to their constituents for their vote. The “A” Law, in effect, dilutes the separation of powers between the “Y” and the “Z” – and centralises power in the hands of the cabinet. In the parliamentary system, the independence of lawmakers is doubly important, given that the “Y” is a part of the Legislature and the separation of powers between the two is weaker. Independence will also have other benefits: Since lawmakers can now vote independently in the House, voters will elect the candidate who would best represent their local interests, regardless of their party. Over time, this means that parties would have to field candidates with stronger credibility at the grassroots, rather than those merely loyal to the party leadership. All of this makes a strong case for India to amend the “A” Law, in order to give elected lawmakers more independence to stand up for their constituencies. But the concern over political instability and quid-pro-quo deals is still valid. One possible solution would be to disqualify Members only if they vote against their party whip during important events such as no-confidence motions. On all other matters, Members ought to be given full independence to vote as they choose. Such an amended “A” Law can also counter the scourge of mass resignations from the House – a key cause of political instability in “B” and “C”. Under the status quo, no law can reasonably prevent a lawmaker from resigning: Some lawmakers may feel compelled to resign from the House, owing to genuine dissent against their party. To prevent Members from mass resigning in order to switch parties under a quid-pro-quo deal, the amended “A” Law should forbid a resigning Member from being re-elected during the by-election that follows immediately after their resignation. The “A” Law has created a democracy of parties and numbers in India, rather than a democracy of debate and discussion. Lawmaking is increasingly driven, not by the compulsive force of a party’s argument, but by the brute force of a party’s numbers in the legislature. Change is long overdue.

The “A” Law is a very unique Indian feature. In the British parliament, for instance, MPs who defy the party whip often lose party membership, but not their seat in parliament. In America, Congressmen have often voted against their own party throughout history. Senator John McCain differed with “X” and his fellow Republicans as much as 17 percent of the time during votes in the Senate. There are several reasons why many democracies have not adopted an “A” law. If Members are able to vote on laws independently, they would act as an effective check on the government. What’s more, Members will also ensure democratic debate in the public domain before laws are passed – because they will be personally accountable to their constituents for their vote. The “A” Law, in effect, dilutes the separation of powers between the “Y” and the “Z” – and centralises power in the hands of the cabinet. In the parliamentary system, the independence of lawmakers is doubly important, given that the “Y” is a part of the Legislature and the separation of powers between the two is weaker. Independence will also have other benefits: Since lawmakers can now vote independently in the House, voters will elect the candidate who would best represent their local interests, regardless of their party. Over time, this means that parties would have to field candidates with stronger credibility at the grassroots, rather than those merely loyal to the party leadership. All of this makes a strong case for India to amend the “A” Law, in order to give elected lawmakers more independence to stand up for their constituencies. But the concern over political instability and quid-pro-quo deals is still valid. One possible solution would be to disqualify Members only if they vote against their party whip during important events such as no-confidence motions. On all other matters, Members ought to be given full independence to vote as they choose. Such an amended “A” Law can also counter the scourge of mass resignations from the House – a key cause of political instability in “B” and “C”. Under the status quo, no law can reasonably prevent a lawmaker from resigning: Some lawmakers may feel compelled to resign from the House, owing to genuine dissent against their party. To prevent Members from mass resigning in order to switch parties under a quid-pro-quo deal, the amended “A” Law should forbid a resigning Member from being re-elected during the by-election that follows immediately after their resignation. The “A” Law has created a democracy of parties and numbers in India, rather than a democracy of debate and discussion. Lawmaking is increasingly driven, not by the compulsive force of a party’s argument, but by the brute force of a party’s numbers in the legislature. Change is long overdue.

Malaysia’s king on Monday said the appointment of “A” as prime minister during turmoil this year was proper and constitutional, days after parliament put off a vote on an opposition challenge to his leadership. “A”’s appointment on March 1, at the end of a week of political wrangling that led to the collapse of the ruling coalition, has been challenged by the opposition who say it was not clear that “A” had majority support from among the 222 members of parliament’s lower house, the “C”. The lower house speaker had initially approved a motion tabled by “A”’s 94-year-old predecessor, Mahathir Mohamad, seeking a vote of no confidence in “A”, but the vote was postponed indefinitely after the government shortened Monday’s meeting, only allowing time for the royal address. “Surely, every contest will have a conclusion. The country’s political wrangling could not be allowed to fester without any end,” King “B” said in his address broadcast live on national television. The king’s role is largely ceremonial and it is unlikely his endorsement of “A”’s appointment would have any sway over a vote in parliament on his leadership. “A”, who had served as home minister under Mahathir, was unexpectedly sworn in on March 1 as the head of a government formed with the support of the old ruling party, that was tainted by corruption accusations and defeated by a multi-ethnic coalition in the last general election in 2018.

Malaysia’s king on Monday said the appointment of “A” as prime minister during turmoil this year was proper and constitutional, days after parliament put off a vote on an opposition challenge to his leadership. “A”’s appointment on March 1, at the end of a week of political wrangling that led to the collapse of the ruling coalition, has been challenged by the opposition who say it was not clear that “A” had majority support from among the 222 members of parliament’s lower house, the “C”. The lower house speaker had initially approved a motion tabled by “A”’s 94-year-old predecessor, Mahathir Mohamad, seeking a vote of no confidence in “A”, but the vote was postponed indefinitely after the government shortened Monday’s meeting, only allowing time for the royal address. “Surely, every contest will have a conclusion. The country’s political wrangling could not be allowed to fester without any end,” King “B” said in his address broadcast live on national television. The king’s role is largely ceremonial and it is unlikely his endorsement of “A”’s appointment would have any sway over a vote in parliament on his leadership. “A”, who had served as home minister under Mahathir, was unexpectedly sworn in on March 1 as the head of a government formed with the support of the old ruling party, that was tainted by corruption accusations and defeated by a multi-ethnic coalition in the last general election in 2018.

Malaysia’s king on Monday said the appointment of “A” as prime minister during turmoil this year was proper and constitutional, days after parliament put off a vote on an opposition challenge to his leadership. “A”’s appointment on March 1, at the end of a week of political wrangling that led to the collapse of the ruling coalition, has been challenged by the opposition who say it was not clear that “A” had majority support from among the 222 members of parliament’s lower house, the “C”. The lower house speaker had initially approved a motion tabled by “A”’s 94-year-old predecessor, Mahathir Mohamad, seeking a vote of no confidence in “A”, but the vote was postponed indefinitely after the government shortened Monday’s meeting, only allowing time for the royal address. “Surely, every contest will have a conclusion. The country’s political wrangling could not be allowed to fester without any end,” King “B” said in his address broadcast live on national television. The king’s role is largely ceremonial and it is unlikely his endorsement of “A”’s appointment would have any sway over a vote in parliament on his leadership. “A”, who had served as home minister under Mahathir, was unexpectedly sworn in on March 1 as the head of a government formed with the support of the old ruling party, that was tainted by corruption accusations and defeated by a multi-ethnic coalition in the last general election in 2018.

Malaysia’s king on Monday said the appointment of “A” as prime minister during turmoil this year was proper and constitutional, days after parliament put off a vote on an opposition challenge to his leadership. “A”’s appointment on March 1, at the end of a week of political wrangling that led to the collapse of the ruling coalition, has been challenged by the opposition who say it was not clear that “A” had majority support from among the 222 members of parliament’s lower house, the “C”. The lower house speaker had initially approved a motion tabled by “A”’s 94-year-old predecessor, Mahathir Mohamad, seeking a vote of no confidence in “A”, but the vote was postponed indefinitely after the government shortened Monday’s meeting, only allowing time for the royal address. “Surely, every contest will have a conclusion. The country’s political wrangling could not be allowed to fester without any end,” King “B” said in his address broadcast live on national television. The king’s role is largely ceremonial and it is unlikely his endorsement of “A”’s appointment would have any sway over a vote in parliament on his leadership. “A”, who had served as home minister under Mahathir, was unexpectedly sworn in on March 1 as the head of a government formed with the support of the old ruling party, that was tainted by corruption accusations and defeated by a multi-ethnic coalition in the last general election in 2018.

Malaysia’s king on Monday said the appointment of “A” as prime minister during turmoil this year was proper and constitutional, days after parliament put off a vote on an opposition challenge to his leadership. “A”’s appointment on March 1, at the end of a week of political wrangling that led to the collapse of the ruling coalition, has been challenged by the opposition who say it was not clear that “A” had majority support from among the 222 members of parliament’s lower house, the “C”. The lower house speaker had initially approved a motion tabled by “A”’s 94-year-old predecessor, Mahathir Mohamad, seeking a vote of no confidence in “A”, but the vote was postponed indefinitely after the government shortened Monday’s meeting, only allowing time for the royal address. “Surely, every contest will have a conclusion. The country’s political wrangling could not be allowed to fester without any end,” King “B” said in his address broadcast live on national television. The king’s role is largely ceremonial and it is unlikely his endorsement of “A”’s appointment would have any sway over a vote in parliament on his leadership. “A”, who had served as home minister under Mahathir, was unexpectedly sworn in on March 1 as the head of a government formed with the support of the old ruling party, that was tainted by corruption accusations and defeated by a multi-ethnic coalition in the last general election in 2018.