CLAT 2021 II GK & Current Affairs Passage Based Questions II 18.11.2020

The “A” Law is a very unique Indian feature. In the British parliament, for instance, MPs who defy the party whip often lose party membership, but not their seat in parliament. In America, Congressmen have often voted against their own party throughout history. Senator John McCain differed with “X” and his fellow Republicans as much as 17 percent of the time during votes in the Senate. There are several reasons why many democracies have not adopted an “A” law. If Members are able to vote on laws independently, they would act as an effective check on the government. What’s more, Members will also ensure democratic debate in the public domain before laws are passed – because they will be personally accountable to their constituents for their vote. The “A” Law, in effect, dilutes the separation of powers between the “Y” and the “Z” – and centralises power in the hands of the cabinet. In the parliamentary system, the independence of lawmakers is doubly important, given that the “Y” is a part of the Legislature and the separation of powers between the two is weaker. Independence will also have other benefits: Since lawmakers can now vote independently in the House, voters will elect the candidate who would best represent their local interests, regardless of their party. Over time, this means that parties would have to field candidates with stronger credibility at the grassroots, rather than those merely loyal to the party leadership. All of this makes a strong case for India to amend the “A” Law, in order to give elected lawmakers more independence to stand up for their constituencies. But the concern over political instability and quid-pro-quo deals is still valid. One possible solution would be to disqualify Members only if they vote against their party whip during important events such as no-confidence motions. On all other matters, Members ought to be given full independence to vote as they choose. Such an amended “A” Law can also counter the scourge of mass resignations from the House – a key cause of political instability in “B” and “C”. Under the status quo, no law can reasonably prevent a lawmaker from resigning: Some lawmakers may feel compelled to resign from the House, owing to genuine dissent against their party. To prevent Members from mass resigning in order to switch parties under a quid-pro-quo deal, the amended “A” Law should forbid a resigning Member from being re-elected during the by-election that follows immediately after their resignation. The “A” Law has created a democracy of parties and numbers in India, rather than a democracy of debate and discussion. Lawmaking is increasingly driven, not by the compulsive force of a party’s argument, but by the brute force of a party’s numbers in the legislature. Change is long overdue.

The “A” Law is a very unique Indian feature. In the British parliament, for instance, MPs who defy the party whip often lose party membership, but not their seat in parliament. In America, Congressmen have often voted against their own party throughout history. Senator John McCain differed with “X” and his fellow Republicans as much as 17 percent of the time during votes in the Senate. There are several reasons why many democracies have not adopted an “A” law. If Members are able to vote on laws independently, they would act as an effective check on the government. What’s more, Members will also ensure democratic debate in the public domain before laws are passed – because they will be personally accountable to their constituents for their vote. The “A” Law, in effect, dilutes the separation of powers between the “Y” and the “Z” – and centralises power in the hands of the cabinet. In the parliamentary system, the independence of lawmakers is doubly important, given that the “Y” is a part of the Legislature and the separation of powers between the two is weaker. Independence will also have other benefits: Since lawmakers can now vote independently in the House, voters will elect the candidate who would best represent their local interests, regardless of their party. Over time, this means that parties would have to field candidates with stronger credibility at the grassroots, rather than those merely loyal to the party leadership. All of this makes a strong case for India to amend the “A” Law, in order to give elected lawmakers more independence to stand up for their constituencies. But the concern over political instability and quid-pro-quo deals is still valid. One possible solution would be to disqualify Members only if they vote against their party whip during important events such as no-confidence motions. On all other matters, Members ought to be given full independence to vote as they choose. Such an amended “A” Law can also counter the scourge of mass resignations from the House – a key cause of political instability in “B” and “C”. Under the status quo, no law can reasonably prevent a lawmaker from resigning: Some lawmakers may feel compelled to resign from the House, owing to genuine dissent against their party. To prevent Members from mass resigning in order to switch parties under a quid-pro-quo deal, the amended “A” Law should forbid a resigning Member from being re-elected during the by-election that follows immediately after their resignation. The “A” Law has created a democracy of parties and numbers in India, rather than a democracy of debate and discussion. Lawmaking is increasingly driven, not by the compulsive force of a party’s argument, but by the brute force of a party’s numbers in the legislature. Change is long overdue.

The “A” Law is a very unique Indian feature. In the British parliament, for instance, MPs who defy the party whip often lose party membership, but not their seat in parliament. In America, Congressmen have often voted against their own party throughout history. Senator John McCain differed with “X” and his fellow Republicans as much as 17 percent of the time during votes in the Senate. There are several reasons why many democracies have not adopted an “A” law. If Members are able to vote on laws independently, they would act as an effective check on the government. What’s more, Members will also ensure democratic debate in the public domain before laws are passed – because they will be personally accountable to their constituents for their vote. The “A” Law, in effect, dilutes the separation of powers between the “Y” and the “Z” – and centralises power in the hands of the cabinet. In the parliamentary system, the independence of lawmakers is doubly important, given that the “Y” is a part of the Legislature and the separation of powers between the two is weaker. Independence will also have other benefits: Since lawmakers can now vote independently in the House, voters will elect the candidate who would best represent their local interests, regardless of their party. Over time, this means that parties would have to field candidates with stronger credibility at the grassroots, rather than those merely loyal to the party leadership. All of this makes a strong case for India to amend the “A” Law, in order to give elected lawmakers more independence to stand up for their constituencies. But the concern over political instability and quid-pro-quo deals is still valid. One possible solution would be to disqualify Members only if they vote against their party whip during important events such as no-confidence motions. On all other matters, Members ought to be given full independence to vote as they choose. Such an amended “A” Law can also counter the scourge of mass resignations from the House – a key cause of political instability in “B” and “C”. Under the status quo, no law can reasonably prevent a lawmaker from resigning: Some lawmakers may feel compelled to resign from the House, owing to genuine dissent against their party. To prevent Members from mass resigning in order to switch parties under a quid-pro-quo deal, the amended “A” Law should forbid a resigning Member from being re-elected during the by-election that follows immediately after their resignation. The “A” Law has created a democracy of parties and numbers in India, rather than a democracy of debate and discussion. Lawmaking is increasingly driven, not by the compulsive force of a party’s argument, but by the brute force of a party’s numbers in the legislature. Change is long overdue.

The “A” Law is a very unique Indian feature. In the British parliament, for instance, MPs who defy the party whip often lose party membership, but not their seat in parliament. In America, Congressmen have often voted against their own party throughout history. Senator John McCain differed with “X” and his fellow Republicans as much as 17 percent of the time during votes in the Senate. There are several reasons why many democracies have not adopted an “A” law. If Members are able to vote on laws independently, they would act as an effective check on the government. What’s more, Members will also ensure democratic debate in the public domain before laws are passed – because they will be personally accountable to their constituents for their vote. The “A” Law, in effect, dilutes the separation of powers between the “Y” and the “Z” – and centralises power in the hands of the cabinet. In the parliamentary system, the independence of lawmakers is doubly important, given that the “Y” is a part of the Legislature and the separation of powers between the two is weaker. Independence will also have other benefits: Since lawmakers can now vote independently in the House, voters will elect the candidate who would best represent their local interests, regardless of their party. Over time, this means that parties would have to field candidates with stronger credibility at the grassroots, rather than those merely loyal to the party leadership. All of this makes a strong case for India to amend the “A” Law, in order to give elected lawmakers more independence to stand up for their constituencies. But the concern over political instability and quid-pro-quo deals is still valid. One possible solution would be to disqualify Members only if they vote against their party whip during important events such as no-confidence motions. On all other matters, Members ought to be given full independence to vote as they choose. Such an amended “A” Law can also counter the scourge of mass resignations from the House – a key cause of political instability in “B” and “C”. Under the status quo, no law can reasonably prevent a lawmaker from resigning: Some lawmakers may feel compelled to resign from the House, owing to genuine dissent against their party. To prevent Members from mass resigning in order to switch parties under a quid-pro-quo deal, the amended “A” Law should forbid a resigning Member from being re-elected during the by-election that follows immediately after their resignation. The “A” Law has created a democracy of parties and numbers in India, rather than a democracy of debate and discussion. Lawmaking is increasingly driven, not by the compulsive force of a party’s argument, but by the brute force of a party’s numbers in the legislature. Change is long overdue.

The “A” Law is a very unique Indian feature. In the British parliament, for instance, MPs who defy the party whip often lose party membership, but not their seat in parliament. In America, Congressmen have often voted against their own party throughout history. Senator John McCain differed with “X” and his fellow Republicans as much as 17 percent of the time during votes in the Senate. There are several reasons why many democracies have not adopted an “A” law. If Members are able to vote on laws independently, they would act as an effective check on the government. What’s more, Members will also ensure democratic debate in the public domain before laws are passed – because they will be personally accountable to their constituents for their vote. The “A” Law, in effect, dilutes the separation of powers between the “Y” and the “Z” – and centralises power in the hands of the cabinet. In the parliamentary system, the independence of lawmakers is doubly important, given that the “Y” is a part of the Legislature and the separation of powers between the two is weaker. Independence will also have other benefits: Since lawmakers can now vote independently in the House, voters will elect the candidate who would best represent their local interests, regardless of their party. Over time, this means that parties would have to field candidates with stronger credibility at the grassroots, rather than those merely loyal to the party leadership. All of this makes a strong case for India to amend the “A” Law, in order to give elected lawmakers more independence to stand up for their constituencies. But the concern over political instability and quid-pro-quo deals is still valid. One possible solution would be to disqualify Members only if they vote against their party whip during important events such as no-confidence motions. On all other matters, Members ought to be given full independence to vote as they choose. Such an amended “A” Law can also counter the scourge of mass resignations from the House – a key cause of political instability in “B” and “C”. Under the status quo, no law can reasonably prevent a lawmaker from resigning: Some lawmakers may feel compelled to resign from the House, owing to genuine dissent against their party. To prevent Members from mass resigning in order to switch parties under a quid-pro-quo deal, the amended “A” Law should forbid a resigning Member from being re-elected during the by-election that follows immediately after their resignation. The “A” Law has created a democracy of parties and numbers in India, rather than a democracy of debate and discussion. Lawmaking is increasingly driven, not by the compulsive force of a party’s argument, but by the brute force of a party’s numbers in the legislature. Change is long overdue.

The Supreme Court ruled that there is no fundamental right to reservations in appointments and promotions under articles 16(4) and 16(4A) of the Constitution.

The case pertains to a decision by the “X” government in 2012. Back then, the government had decided to fill up posts in public services without providing reservation to members of the Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe (ST) communities. The “X” High Court directed the state government in 2019 to implement reservations in promotion by promoting only SCs and STs to maintain the quota earmarked for the said categories.

The fact that reservation cannot be claimed as a fundamental right is a settled position under the law and has been pointed out by several judgments in the past. In 1967, a five-judge bench in “Y” held that the government is under no constitutional duty to provide reservations for SCs and STs, either at the initial stage of recruitment or at the stage of promotion.

The court said that no mandamus can be issued by the court directing state governments to provide reservations. The position went on to be reiterated in several other decisions, including the nine-judge bench ruling in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) and the five-judge bench decision in M Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006). Although this position of law is a settled one, it is nonetheless at odds with certain other principles at the heart of the constitutional vision of equality. In NM Thomas judgement (1976), the Supreme Court held that the Constitution was committed to an idea of substantive equality, i.e. it had to take the actual circumstances of people into account when determining what constituted “equal treatment”. The principled reason for this position was that groups of people who face structural and institutional barriers towards being able to compete on “equal terms” with others in society — for reasons that are historical, but whose effects are enduring — must be treated in a way that mitigates those existing conditions of inequality.

Reservations — under this understanding — were a means to bring about genuine and true equality, and not a set of privileges or gifts.

The Supreme Court ruled that there is no fundamental right to reservations in appointments and promotions under articles 16(4) and 16(4A) of the Constitution.

The case pertains to a decision by the “X” government in 2012. Back then, the government had decided to fill up posts in public services without providing reservation to members of the Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe (ST) communities. The “X” High Court directed the state government in 2019 to implement reservations in promotion by promoting only SCs and STs to maintain the quota earmarked for the said categories.

The fact that reservation cannot be claimed as a fundamental right is a settled position under the law and has been pointed out by several judgments in the past. In 1967, a five-judge bench in “Y” held that the government is under no constitutional duty to provide reservations for SCs and STs, either at the initial stage of recruitment or at the stage of promotion.

The court said that no mandamus can be issued by the court directing state governments to provide reservations. The position went on to be reiterated in several other decisions, including the nine-judge bench ruling in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) and the five-judge bench decision in M Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006). Although this position of law is a settled one, it is nonetheless at odds with certain other principles at the heart of the constitutional vision of equality. In NM Thomas judgement (1976), the Supreme Court held that the Constitution was committed to an idea of substantive equality, i.e. it had to take the actual circumstances of people into account when determining what constituted “equal treatment”. The principled reason for this position was that groups of people who face structural and institutional barriers towards being able to compete on “equal terms” with others in society — for reasons that are historical, but whose effects are enduring — must be treated in a way that mitigates those existing conditions of inequality.

Reservations — under this understanding — were a means to bring about genuine and true equality, and not a set of privileges or gifts.

The Supreme Court ruled that there is no fundamental right to reservations in appointments and promotions under articles 16(4) and 16(4A) of the Constitution.

The case pertains to a decision by the “X” government in 2012. Back then, the government had decided to fill up posts in public services without providing reservation to members of the Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe (ST) communities. The “X” High Court directed the state government in 2019 to implement reservations in promotion by promoting only SCs and STs to maintain the quota earmarked for the said categories.

The fact that reservation cannot be claimed as a fundamental right is a settled position under the law and has been pointed out by several judgments in the past. In 1967, a five-judge bench in “Y” held that the government is under no constitutional duty to provide reservations for SCs and STs, either at the initial stage of recruitment or at the stage of promotion.

The court said that no mandamus can be issued by the court directing state governments to provide reservations. The position went on to be reiterated in several other decisions, including the nine-judge bench ruling in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) and the five-judge bench decision in M Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006). Although this position of law is a settled one, it is nonetheless at odds with certain other principles at the heart of the constitutional vision of equality. In NM Thomas judgement (1976), the Supreme Court held that the Constitution was committed to an idea of substantive equality, i.e. it had to take the actual circumstances of people into account when determining what constituted “equal treatment”. The principled reason for this position was that groups of people who face structural and institutional barriers towards being able to compete on “equal terms” with others in society — for reasons that are historical, but whose effects are enduring — must be treated in a way that mitigates those existing conditions of inequality.

Reservations — under this understanding — were a means to bring about genuine and true equality, and not a set of privileges or gifts.

The Supreme Court ruled that there is no fundamental right to reservations in appointments and promotions under articles 16(4) and 16(4A) of the Constitution.

The case pertains to a decision by the “X” government in 2012. Back then, the government had decided to fill up posts in public services without providing reservation to members of the Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe (ST) communities. The “X” High Court directed the state government in 2019 to implement reservations in promotion by promoting only SCs and STs to maintain the quota earmarked for the said categories.

The fact that reservation cannot be claimed as a fundamental right is a settled position under the law and has been pointed out by several judgments in the past. In 1967, a five-judge bench in “Y” held that the government is under no constitutional duty to provide reservations for SCs and STs, either at the initial stage of recruitment or at the stage of promotion.

The court said that no mandamus can be issued by the court directing state governments to provide reservations. The position went on to be reiterated in several other decisions, including the nine-judge bench ruling in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) and the five-judge bench decision in M Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006). Although this position of law is a settled one, it is nonetheless at odds with certain other principles at the heart of the constitutional vision of equality. In NM Thomas judgement (1976), the Supreme Court held that the Constitution was committed to an idea of substantive equality, i.e. it had to take the actual circumstances of people into account when determining what constituted “equal treatment”. The principled reason for this position was that groups of people who face structural and institutional barriers towards being able to compete on “equal terms” with others in society — for reasons that are historical, but whose effects are enduring — must be treated in a way that mitigates those existing conditions of inequality.

Reservations — under this understanding — were a means to bring about genuine and true equality, and not a set of privileges or gifts.

The Supreme Court ruled that there is no fundamental right to reservations in appointments and promotions under articles 16(4) and 16(4A) of the Constitution.

The case pertains to a decision by the “X” government in 2012. Back then, the government had decided to fill up posts in public services without providing reservation to members of the Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe (ST) communities. The “X” High Court directed the state government in 2019 to implement reservations in promotion by promoting only SCs and STs to maintain the quota earmarked for the said categories.

The fact that reservation cannot be claimed as a fundamental right is a settled position under the law and has been pointed out by several judgments in the past. In 1967, a five-judge bench in “Y” held that the government is under no constitutional duty to provide reservations for SCs and STs, either at the initial stage of recruitment or at the stage of promotion.

The court said that no mandamus can be issued by the court directing state governments to provide reservations. The position went on to be reiterated in several other decisions, including the nine-judge bench ruling in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) and the five-judge bench decision in M Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006). Although this position of law is a settled one, it is nonetheless at odds with certain other principles at the heart of the constitutional vision of equality. In NM Thomas judgement (1976), the Supreme Court held that the Constitution was committed to an idea of substantive equality, i.e. it had to take the actual circumstances of people into account when determining what constituted “equal treatment”. The principled reason for this position was that groups of people who face structural and institutional barriers towards being able to compete on “equal terms” with others in society — for reasons that are historical, but whose effects are enduring — must be treated in a way that mitigates those existing conditions of inequality.

Reservations — under this understanding — were a means to bring about genuine and true equality, and not a set of privileges or gifts.